An Information Flow Control Model for the Cloud

Thomas F. J.-M. Pasquier, Jatinder Singh and Jean Bacon
Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge
Email: firstname.lastname@cl.cam.ac.uk
Olivier Hermant
MINES ParisTech
Email: hermant@cri.ensmp.fr

Abstract—Concern about data leakage is holding back more widespread adoption of cloud computing by companies and public institutions alike. There is an increasing volume of legislation that describes the nature and/or source of the data such as healthcare, personal, government-information etc. Flows are permitted only if the labels match, as defined in IFC. The challenge in integrating multiple applications’ access control policy with IFC is to create labels that express policy accurately, concisely, naturally and efficiently, and in a way that makes policy changes easy to implement. We believe the new 2D tag design we present here contributes substantially to this goal.

We have previously investigated how labels can be used to enforce certain laws and regulations, such as “data originating in the EU must not leave its boundaries, except to certain Safe Harbors” [1], [5], [6]. A simple tag EU can be used for this purpose. But access control policies in general have great richness and complexity whereas IFC should be simple to express and enforce, to minimise runtime overhead while allowing compliance to be audited. A major research question is “which aspects of access control policies need to be embodied in IFC tags for continuous, runtime, cross-application enforcement?”

Essentially, problems arise when some software can access all data items of a certain kind, for example to perform analytics, generate statistics, anonymise or encrypt, as required for ‘Big Data’, and other software is restricted to access only one such item, see [1], [IV].

We propose two-component tags to represent the concern of data and a specifier for an item of that kind, for example (medical, bob) for Bob’s medical record, and have implemented this in FlowK2. Such labels more closely reflect the policy maker’s intent than previous models, and current single-component tags can easily be expressed in this way, such as (location, EU) or (regulation, EU111). We have experience of collaboration in healthcare record management [7], [8] and monitoring [9] and take examples from this domain to demonstrate the use of IFC.

The main contribution of this paper is the enhancement of standard IFC tags to make IFC feasible for ‘Big Data’ processing in the cloud and to allow better expression and maintenance of policy. The ability to express Conflict of Interest (Col) is new in FlowK (III-E) and Col support is more powerful, concisely expressed and capable of maintenance in FlowK2 (IV-C). We have presented a proof-of-concept performance evaluation of FlowK elsewhere [2] and here focus on a comparison of the new tag model with standard IFC.

II outlines IFC models and application level policy expression. III presents our original FlowK model. IV gives some motivating examples underlying the design of FlowK2.
showing how two-component tags solve problems of large-scale data processing under IFC. In [V] presents the FlowK2 label model, extending that of FlowK. In [VI] we outline the evaluation presented elsewhere and show that the modifications can easily be implemented and do not affect performance noticeably. [VII] concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In this section we first introduce IFC and give an overview of IFC implementations. We then highlight the importance of what IFC potentially delivers when offered as part of cloud service provision. Finally we consider the well established area of authorisation policy with a view to establishing which aspects should be carried forward into IFC tags for runtime enforcement.

A. IFC Models & Implementations

IFC is not new. It has long been argued that standard security techniques, such as firewalls and access control mechanisms, are not enough to prevent information leakage [10]. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of such mechanisms to determine whether, after the controls they impose, the information is used correctly. For example it is difficult to determine if the confidentiality of decrypted data is respected [11]. We therefore need to protect information flow end-to-end, in particular when information is transmitted within and between applications.

In 1976, Denning [10] proposed a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model to track and enforce rules on information flow in computer systems. In this model, entities are associated with security classes. The flow of information from an entity a to an entity b is allowed only if the security class of b (denoted b) is equal to or higher than a. This allows the no-read up, no-write down principle of Bell and LaPadula [12] to be implemented to enforce secrecy. By this means a traditional military classification public, secret, top secret can be implemented. A second security class can be associated with each entity to track and enforce integrity (quality of data) during reading down and writing up, as proposed by Biba [13]. A current example might distinguish information from a government website in the .gov.uk domain from that from “Joe’s Blog”. Using this model we are able to control and monitor information flow to ensure data secrecy and integrity.

In 1997 Myers [14] introduced a decentralised IFC model (DIFC) that has inspired most later work. This model was designed to meet the changing needs of systems from global, static, hierarchical security levels to a more fluid system, able to capture the needs of different applications. In this model each entity is associated with two labels: a secrecy label and an integrity label, to capture respectively the privacy/confidentiality of the data and the reliability of a source of data. Each label comprises a set of tags, each of which represents some security concern. Data are allowed to flow if the security label of the sender is a subset of the label of the receiver, and conversely for integrity.

We describe in [III] the model we use in FlowK that follows this general idea. Details of implementations of IFC at language [11], language library and operating system level are given in [2], [15]. She et al. [16] use run-time dependency and information flow control to track information within and between services in a cloud service composition chain. Roy et al. [17] and Akoush et al. [18] propose to implement IFC in a MapReduce framework to prevent the computation provider leaking data from the data provider. In [III] we present a modification to the IFC model to support scaling to millions of user-defined tags. Finally, Xie et al. [19] propose IFC to secure stream processing in the cloud to prevent data disclosure between competing organisations. They implement a Chinese Wall policy, improving on [20]. Our model described in [III] achieves this through Conflict of Interest groups. In this paper we focus on using IFC to express and enforce application level policy.

B. The need for IFC in Cloud Computing

IFC controls and restricts the use of data beyond applications’ access control points, during the whole life cycle of a piece of information. Therefore users and applications can safely share and exchange data, if they are willing to trust the cloud provider as a policy-enforcing third-party. Indeed, IFC allows the nature of the shared data usage to be defined precisely and enforced (e.g., data labelled as medical can only flow to applications that have been authorised to manipulate such data and are labelled as such). The trust relationship is greatly simplified as only a common, well-defined party needs to be trusted (i.e., the cloud provider). This potentially leads to more data sharing and the emergence of cross-silo innovative applications.

Our IFC design is such that application instances need not be aware that their execution is controlled by IFC. We built a framework for web service provision [2] where an application manager is privileged to create a security context for each application instance, see [III]. This involves creating tags and assigning labels to application instances.

IFC enforcement takes place on every system call and inter-machine data exchange. It is therefore a natural place for an audit log to be created; moreover, such a log is in terms of applications’ data flows rather than low-level system concerns. Such an audit log can be used by cloud providers to demonstrate compliance with laws, regulations and contracts. It can also be used to show whether a claimed data leak did in fact occur. Such logs are ‘Big Data’ and tools are needed to process them efficiently.

Authorisation policy tends to be application-specific. When data needs to be used by more than one application, policy differences and conflicts can occur. When data is labelled for IFC, authorisation policy is enforced across all entities that use the data. As data sharing becomes more pervasive, for example when cloud services are incorporated into ‘Internet of Things’ applications, system-wide, end-to-end policy enforcement will be crucial.

IFC does not have cybersecurity as its main focus but its detection of attempted illegal flows and its strict containment of data flows can contribute to early detection and/or damage limitation.

C. Role Based Access Control

RBAC is a mature, widely used access control scheme with a large literature and existing standards [21], [22]. Role definitions in RBAC tend to be functional in their scope, being application- or organisation-specific. Administrative roles are also included to capture the need to manage RBAC itself.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/
In work on RBAC by ourselves [8] and others [23], [24],
parametred roles were found to provide elegant expression
of policy and avoid explosion in the number of roles required.
For example, certain company software such as “Payroll” may
need to access all employees’ data whereas each employee can
access only their own data record. To achieve this, a company
either creates a role per employee e.g. employee_smith or
parametres a single role, for example employee(smith) etc.
The Payroll software can then access employee(*), where *
indicates all employees. In this paper we argue that the IFC
label model needs similar refinement in order to carry forward
to runtime such aspects of application policy, thus following
the PoLP.

Role parametrisation allows for relationships between para-
ments and for exclusions to be checked. For example the
role treating_doctor(doctorID, patientID) allows the role
to express the dynamic set of patients for each doctor for
controlling access to records. An exclusion is expressed as
a rule on a parameter value to indicate, for example, “all
doctors can access my records except doctorID”, see [8].
In [14] we argue that such checks are most appropriately
carried out at the authorisation point within the application.
Environmental/context checks such as “A Pharmacist can only
authorise the issuing of drugs while on duty in the Pharmacy”
can be enforced continuously by IFC using appropriate label
design.

III. ATOMIC TAG MODEL

IFC augments authorisation by enforcing dynamically, end-
to-end, across applications, that only permitted flows of infor-
mation can occur. Entities to which IFC constraints are applied
include cloud web applications [2], a web worker instance [18],
a file, a database entry [25] etc.. IFC is applied continuously,
typically on every system call for an IFC-enabled OS. IFC
policy should therefore be as simple as possible, to allow
verification and human understanding and to minimise runtime
overhead.

A. Enforcing Safe Flows via Labels

A tag within a label’s set of tags represents a particular
security concern for a category of data. In our IFC model
two labels are associated with every entity A: a secrecy label
S(A) and an integrity label I(A). The current state of these
two labels (sets of tags) is the security context of an entity.

A flow of information from an entity A to an entity
B, denoted A → B, is allowed if the following rules are
respected:

A → B, iff S(A) ≼ S(B) ∧ I(B) ≼ I(A)   (1)

where the preorder ≼ denotes mere inclusion (it will be
refined for our two-component tag model in [14]). These checks
are simple to understand and apply, involving only matching of
the tags at the communication endpoints.

Consider the read and write functions of the Bell-LaPadula
model [13] and the Biba model [15]. In the IFC world read is
the equivalent of an incoming flow and write is the equivalent
of an outgoing flow. The subrule concerning secrecy labels
ensures that an entity only passes information to an entity
that is allowed to receive it, thus enforcing the “no read
up, no write down” policy of the Bell-LaPadula model. The
subrule concerning integrity labels enforces quality of data
during reading down and writing up, as proposed by Biba
[13]. It is therefore possible to represent traditional security
requirements as IFC constraints, although we use labels to
represent more general security contexts, e.g., integrity can
also indicate authority, such as to send an actuation command
to a vehicle or home automation device.

Example – secrecy: Suppose a hospital patient Bob, on being
discharged to his home, is issued with a heart monitor. Data
from this device is stored in his home system and also flows to
a process in the hospital’s system, which carries out an analysis
of his condition. Because Bob’s health data is private the heart
monitor and data are labelled with S = \{medical, bob\}. In
order to receive this data, the hospital process’s S label must
also include the tags medical and bob.

Example – integrity: The hospital process is only allowed to
receive data from a hospital-issued device and to achieve this is
labelled I = \{hospital – issued\}. In order to send data to the
hospital process, Bob’s device and data must also be labelled
I = \{hospital – issued\}. Suppose Bob’s heart monitor is
capable of remote actuation, e.g. to change the sampling rate
if analysis detects a possible health problem. The device must
only accept actuation commands from authorised sources, e.g.
also labelled I = \{hospital – issued\}.

B. Creation of an Entity

We define A ⇒ B as the operation of the entity A creating
the entity B. We have the following rules for creation:

if A ⇒ B, then S(B) := S(A) and I(B) := I(A)   (2)

That is, the created entity inherits the labels of its creator.
Examples are creating a process in a Unix-style OS by fork
and creating passive data such as files or messages.

C. Privileges for Managing Tags and Labels

Certain active entities (e.g. an application manager) have
privileges that allow them to modify their labels. An entity has
two sets of privileges for removing tags from its secrecy and
integrity labels (P^−_S for S and P^−_I for I), and two sets for
adding tags to these labels (P^+_S for S and P^+_I for I). That is,
for an entity A to remove the tag t_s ∈ S(A), it is necessary
that t_s ∈ P^−_S(A), similarly to add the tag t_t to the label I(A)
it is necessary that t_t ∈ P^+_I(A).

For an entity A, a label X(A) (where X is S or I) and a
tag t, a change of the label is authorised if the following rule is
respected:

X(A) := X(A) ∪ \{t\} if t ∈ P^+_X(A) or
X(A) := X(A) \{t\} if t ∈ P^−_X(A)   (3)

For example, in order to receive information from an entity
B, an entity A will need to set its labels (if it has the privilege)
such that the flow constraints expressed by the tags associated
with B are respected, that is such that the flow B → A respects
the safe flow subrules in rule (1). We propose the following notation:
for a process and its labels (A, S, I) → (A′, S′, I′) is the
modification of the process labels following rule (3).

Only privileged processes can change their security context.
We envisage application instances running within a constant
security context and being unaware of IFC [2]. A privileged
application manager creates these instances, and privileged
processes are invoked transparently.
Example – declassification: Suppose the hospital that receives health monitoring data from its patients at home wishes to make these data available for research on the efficacy of home monitoring. Before releasing such data set it must be anonymised, i.e. individual patients must not be identifiable from the data. A process that carries out the anonymisation process must have the privilege to read the private data before anonymisation; i.e. the input data set and the process may be labelled $S = \{medical, private\}$. After anonymisation, the process must output data labelled with, say, $S = \{medical, anonymised\}$. The anonymisation process must therefore have the privilege to remove the tag private from its S label and add the tag anonymised before outputting the data.

In the case where data needs to become more carefully controlled and less widely available, e.g., after decryption, the reverse process of classification would involve, e.g. removing a tag encrypted and adding a tag private.

Example – endorsement: Endorsement usually involves adding a tag to an I label. For example, a process might receive data from the network, carry out a verification process then output the data with tag valid_data. Such a process may be involved in data format conversion if non-standard data could be input from a remote source. A similar endorsement process can be used for many kinds of input data such as PHP scripts, downloaded software, indeed, any input amenable to a validation process.

In our hospital example, the patient may have received some treatment in another hospital or clinic and have a treatment record there, where the format may differ. A process is charged with checking the patient’s identity and verifying the data, including reformatting. The data is then output with tag valid_data and can be safely processed within the hospital domain.

Integrity tags may need to be removed after an anonymisation process, as the quality of data may have been degraded by the process. For example, if detailed information is removed, the data may no longer be proper to use as the source of an actuation decision.

D. Creation and Privileges

On creation, labels are automatically inherited by a created entity from its creator (rule 2), but privileges are not. If the child is to be given privileges over its labels, they must be passed explicitly. We denote the flow generated by an entity $A$ giving selected privileges $\mathcal{P}_X$ to an entity $B$ as $A \xrightarrow{\mathcal{P}_X} B$ (for example allowing $t$ to be removed from $S$, would be denoted $A \xrightarrow{\mathcal{P}_X} S$). In order for a process to delegate a privilege to another process it must own this privilege itself. That is,

$$A \xrightarrow{\mathcal{P}_X} B \text{ only if } t \in P_X(A)$$

(4)

E. Separation of Duty (SoD) and Conflict-of-Interest (CoI)

A policy maker may need to specify a SoD or CoI between principals and/or roles [25], [27]. An example of SoD is that an auditor may not audit their own actions. A CoI may arise when a principal could give professional advice to a number of competing companies. Separation of data access may be enforced by a Chinese Wall policy [27].

We believe CoI support in IFC is unique to FlowK. We define a set $C$ of tags that represents some specified conflicting interests. In order for the configuration of an entity $A$ to be valid with respect to $C$, rule (5) must be respected:

$$\left[ S(A) \cup P(A) \cup F(A) \cup P^+_X(A) \cup P^+_Y(A) \cup P^-_X(A) \cup P^-_Y(A) \right] \cap C \leq 1$$

(5)

That is, an entity is non-conflicting in this context if the set of its potential tags (past, present and future) contains at most one element from the set of tags within the related CoI group. In detail, by potential tags we mean the tags in its current $S$ and $I$ labels and those that it has the privilege to add to $S(A)$ (i.e. $P^+_X(A)$) and to $I(A)$ (i.e. $P^+_Y(A)$) or that it may have removed from $S(A)$ (i.e. $P^-_X(A)$) and from $I(A)$ (i.e. $P^-_Y(A)$). CoI rules should be checked every time a privilege is granted.

Example – conflict of interest: A CoI might arise when data relating to competing companies is available in a system. In a hospital context, this might involve the results of analysis of the usage and effects of drugs from competing Pharmaceutical companies. The companies might agree to this analysis only if their data is guaranteed to be isolated, i.e. not leaked to other companies.

Taking a simple example from everyday life: suppose a conflict is $C = \{fiat, ford, audi, \ldots\}$ and some data (e.g. files) are labelled FiatData[$S = \{fiat\}$, $I = \emptyset$] and FordData[$S = \{ford\}$, $I = \emptyset$]. The CoI described ensures that it is not possible for a single entity (e.g. an application instance) to have access to both FordData and FiatData either simultaneously or sequentially, i.e. enforcing that Ford-owned data and Fiat-owned data are processed in isolation.

IV. Motivating Use Cases

In this section we motivate the use of two-component tags in FlowK2’s label model. Our model is designed for a distributed system or cloud platform where there is likely to be a large amount of user data stored with persistent labels in files, databases, key-value stores etc. In a company context, data records may relate to individual employees; in a public health context, data may be the medical records of patients; in an educational context, data may relate to students, staff etc. Specifying and enforcing access to all, some specified subgroup or only one data record of a given type is a universal requirement, discussed in the literature on policy.

Suppose a principal is allowed access to a subset of records, e.g. doctors may be able to access only the records of the patients they are currently treating. Temporally separated instantiations of the application are likely, i.e. to one patient’s records at a time. Each time, current authorisation policy is enforced and is translated into labels to ensure correct behaviour at runtime. Note that as a doctor’s group of patients under treatment changes, a lookup of current patients at the authorisation point in the application will ensure that labels are created only for current patients, selected at runtime from the entire database.

The first use case below arises from the need of certain software to perform computations on all records of a given type, whereas other software is authorised only to access records on behalf of a single individual. The second considers a system log containing records from all running applications relating to large numbers of principals. These problems are akin to the role proliferation that motivated role parametrisation in RBAC,
We have solved these problems by making our tags more expressive to reflect the intended policy more accurately. Also, this new tag structure correctly represents the trust that should be placed in certain entities, according to PoLP. We use two-component tags, where a tag is of the form \((\text{concern}, \text{specifier})\). We use \((\text{concern}, *)\) to indicate all tags of the specified concern and \((*, \text{specifier})\) for tags of all concerns with the given specifier, \((*, *)\) then indicates all tags in some naming domain. In §IV we present this label model more formally.

A. Data Analysis

In the healthcare domain, statistical analysis of the medical records of patients is needed for various purposes including public health, environmental concerns, clinical practice etc. We are concerned with the privacy and confidentiality of medical data and will therefore discuss the construction of the IFC secrecy label for a statistical analysis program.

In the current FlowK model a tag represents a single security concern. To express the idea of Bob’s medical data, we would use two tags \(\text{bob\_data}\) and \(\text{medical\_data}\). The entity carrying out the statistical analysis of the medical data would then need to have not only the \(\text{medical\_data}\) tag, but also a tag corresponding to every patient’s data, for rule (1) to be satisfied. This makes the use of IFC infeasible for such purposes: (1) The performance implications are significant. We have shown [2] that the processing overhead induced by the number of tags in labels is not insignificant (especially at this scale). (2) Enumerating “all” tags would be prone to error as the database state changes, with records being added and removed. (3) This entity would be over-privileged by the PoLP, being able to access any data labelled only with the tag \(\text{bob\_data}\) although our intention was for it only to be concerned with \(\text{medical\_data}\). It would also be privileged to declassify, see [III-C] over all the patients’ personal tags and trusted not to leak information about any patient. An alternative would be to define different tags for every category of user data such as \(\text{bob\_medical\_data}\), \(\text{bob\_tax\_data}\), \(\text{bob\_home\_data}\) and many more. The performance issues caused by huge numbers of tags would still hold. Also, an entity running on behalf of Bob could not simply have a label with a single tag \(\text{bob\_data}\) but would have to enumerate all the particular types of Bob’s data it could process.

The problems are solved by using two-component tags, where a tag is of the form \((\text{concern}, \text{specifier})\). In Fig. 1 we illustrate how such IFC tags can be used to constrain the flow of data within a ‘big data’ computation graph. The first computation phase aggregates medical and private information belonging to individual patients. The second phase anonymises these aggregates and the third generates statistical data from the anonymised data.

In detail, suppose each input record has an \(S\) label containing a tag such as \((\text{medical\_patient\_id})\) or \((\text{private\_patient\_id})\). We express that the first phase processing components can access all data belonging to a patient by including the tag \((*, \text{patient\_id})\) in their \(S\) labels, where * indicates all records with specifier \(\text{patient\_id}\). These components output equivalently labelled data \((\text{medical\_patient\_id})\) which is input to the second phase components (also labelled \((*, \text{patient\_id})\)) for anonymisation. The anonymisers must change their security context (see [II-C]) in order to output data labelled \((*, \text{anonymised})\).

The third phase processes (also labelled \((*, \text{anonymised})\)) input the anonymised data and carry out statistical analysis. These processes must change their security context in order to output data labelled \((\text{statistics\_anonymised})\). Finally, the anonymised statistical data is used, the results being output without need of a further security context change.

By specifying for each task the expected input and output security context and enforcing them in the operating system and across machines, we are able to guarantee that no data leakage can occur between concerns (e.g. from private to medical) or between specifiers (i.e. patients).

B. Log Audit

Consider a system log which several active entities are able to access. A process concerned with digital forensics requires access to the whole log to detect and investigate suspicious patterns of behaviour; applications, e.g. cloud tenants, and individual users should be able to audit the use of their own data.

With the current model an entity performing audit over all log records would need access to all relevant concerns and specifiers: in FlowK2’s model \((*, *)\). It would need declassification privileges over all those data for the audit result to be readable as required, see [V]. An entity performing audit over data logs for specified applications would need \((\text{application\_name}, *)\) and again, the privilege to declassify over all specifiers. The tag needed by the entity performing audit on behalf of an individual over all their data (from any application) would be \((*, \text{person\_name})\). The entity would need the privilege to declassify the output, see [V].

In this section we have given the intuition and motivating examples for the two-component label model of FlowK2. In the next section we present the formal notation, extending the FlowK model.

V. TWO-COMPONENT TAG MODEL

A major aim for FlowK was simplicity, for ease of understanding and verification, and efficiency of enforcement. This section presents the formal notation for the two-component tag model of FlowK2, as motivated in [IV]. We will show that policy, particularly for large-scale data processing, is expressed more concisely using FlowK2 and is easier to
maintain. Also, tag-checking overhead is comparable for small-scale processing and is reduced for large-scale processing.

We propose to decompose a tag \( t \) into a pair \( \langle c, s \rangle \) with \( c \) the concern of type \( \mathcal{C} \) and \( s \) a specifier of type \( \mathcal{S} \). For example, the pair \( \langle \text{medical}, \text{bob} \rangle \) represent Bob’s medical data.

A statistical analysis over a set of patients’ medical data is represented as \( \langle \text{medical, statistical_analysis} \rangle \) and anonymised medical records as \( \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \).

As we saw in \( \triangleright \), a major requirement is to be able to specify all data records of a certain kind without enumerating all possible tags, as required by current models. Therefore for any concern \( c \) and specifier \( s \) we establish the following subtyping relation:

\[
\langle c, * \rangle \sqsubseteq \langle *, * \rangle \sqsubseteq \langle s, * \rangle
\]

That is, a tag \( t = \langle c, s \rangle \) is a subtype of \( t’ = \langle c, * \rangle \) and \( t” = \langle *, * \rangle \) which are themselves subtypes of \( t’ll = \langle *, * \rangle \). For instance, \( \langle \text{medical, bob} \rangle \) (Bob’s medical data) is a subtype of \( \langle \text{medical} \rangle \) (medical data) and a subtype of \( \langle *, \text{bob} \rangle \) (Bob’s data) which are each subtypes of \( \langle *, * \rangle \) (all data in the current naming domain).

A. Changes to Flow Constraints

To adapt rule (1) from [III-A] for the flow \( A \rightarrow B \), we need only redefine the \( \preceq \) binary relation between sets of tags \( X \) and \( Y \) as follows:

\[
X \preceq Y \text{ iff } \forall t \in X \exists t’ \in Y : t \preceq t’
\]

Together with rule (1), this entails that a flow \( A \rightarrow B \) is allowed if and only if for all secrecy tags of \( A \) there exists a supertype in the secrecy tags of \( B \) and that for all integrity tags of \( B \) there exists a supertype in the integrity tags of \( A \).

Example – secrecy: The examples illustrating the FlowK model given in [III] relate to hospital patients being monitored in their homes. We saw that the process receiving Bob’s heart rate data, labelled with \( S = \{ \langle \text{medical, bob} \rangle \} \), also needed to have the tags \( \text{medical} \) and \( \text{bob} \) in its \( S \) label. All labels would need to be kept consistent with the current set of home-monitored patients. Instead, in FlowK2, we propose to label the process \( S = \{ \langle \text{medical} \rangle \} \). This expresses the intended policy concisely and accurately, without the need to maintain the current set of patients’ tags. In the implementation, the tag matching overhead on every system call is linear with the number of tags \( \triangleright \). This overhead is reduced by using the single 2D tag \( \langle \text{medical}, * \rangle \).

Example – integrity: Consider a home control (domotic) system. An entity \( A \) labelled \( I(A) = \{ \langle \text{actuator, *} \rangle \} \) is able to send data (an action instruction) to an entity \( B \) labelled \( I(B) = \{ \langle \text{actuator, alarm} \rangle \} \) or an entity \( C \) labelled \( I(C) = \{ \langle \text{actuator, light} \rangle \} \). The entity \( A \) could represent the central domotic control system with \( B \) and \( C \) being actuators in the house. In a patient monitoring context the controller might be sending actuation commands to a variety of patient monitoring devices, e.g., to start, stop or change the monitoring intervals. Since actuation affects the physical world, including people’s health and safety, it is important that the authority of the actuation command is established.

B. Changes to Privileges

Rule (3) from [III] becomes (where \( X \) is \( S \) or \( I \)):

\[
X(A) := X(A) \cup \{ t \} \text{ if } \exists t’ \in P_X^S(A) : t \preceq t’ \quad \text{ or }
X(A) := X(A) \setminus \{ t \} \text{ if } \exists t’ \in P_X^I(A) : t \preceq t’
\]

We also add special privileges noted \( \langle \text{actuator, *} \rangle \) and \( \langle \text{network, *} \rangle \) that allow removal only of the labels \( \langle c, * \rangle \), \( \langle *, * \rangle \) and \( \langle *, * \rangle \) respectively.

The privilege delegation rule (4), becomes:

\[
A \xrightarrow{\pm} B \text{ only if } \exists t’ \in P_X^S(A) : t \preceq t’
\]

Examples – declassification: A process \( A \) with the privilege \( P_S^A(A) = \{ \langle \text{medical, *} \rangle \} \) and the label \( S(A) = \{ \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \} \) is able to declassify to \( S(A) = \{ \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \} \), but does not have the privilege to remove \( \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \). The use of \( \Delta \) privileges therefore allows the trust placed in a certain entity to be precise and is particularly useful when specifying declassifier privileges. Without it, we would have had only \( P_S^A(A) = \{ \langle \text{medical, *} \rangle \} \) and no guarantee that the process would not declassify to \( S(A) = \emptyset \) (also removing \( \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \)), thus allowing universal access to the anonymised data, rather than to medical research processes with the tag \( \langle \text{medical, anonymised} \rangle \).

Examples – integrity label changes: A process \( A \), with the privilege \( P_S^A(A) = \{ \langle \text{actuator, *} \rangle \} \) and the label \( I(A) = \{ \langle \text{actuator, alarm} \rangle \} \) is able to remove the tag \( \langle \text{actuator, *} \rangle \) but not the tag \( \langle \text{actuator, alarm} \rangle \). A process \( A \) with the privilege \( P_S^A(A) = \{ \langle \text{local, *} \rangle \} \) and the label \( I(A) = \{ \langle \text{network, *} \rangle \} \) is able to remove the tag \( \langle \text{local, *} \rangle \) after endorsing local input but not the tag \( \langle \text{network, *} \rangle \).

C. Changes to Conflicts of Interest

There are now three types of policy we must express: constraints applied to whole tags, to concerns and to specifiers. We define three operations on a tag’s pair, the projections \( \pi_1 \) in \( \mathcal{C} \), \( \pi_2 \) in \( \mathcal{S} \) and the identity function id:

\[
\pi_1 : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \quad \pi_2 : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{S} \quad \text{id} : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S}
\]

We extend these operations to sets, such that:

\[
\pi_1 : \wp(\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{C}) \quad \pi_2 : \wp(\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{S}) \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{S})
\]

\[
\pi_1(T) = \{ \langle c, s \rangle \mid t \in T \} \quad \pi_2(T) = \{ \langle c, s \rangle \mid t \in T \} \quad \text{id}(T) = \{ \langle c, s \rangle \mid t \in T \}
\]

For an entity \( A \) we note the union of its labels and privileges:

\[
SU(A) = S(A) \cup I(A) \cup P_S^A(A) \cup P_I^A(A) \cup P_T^A(\text{Actuator}) \cup P_T^A(\text{Alarm})
\]

A conflict of interest is denoted \( P_{Col}(f, G) \) where \( f \) is \( \pi_1 \), \( \pi_2 \) or id and \( G \) is a set of conflicting tags. Rule (5) in [III] becomes (where \( \mathcal{C} \) is a Col group):

\[
\forall P_{Col}(f, C), |f(SU(A)) \cap C| \leq 1
\]
Here we note:

- \( \{a, b, c\} \cap \{\ast\} = \{a, b, c\} \);
- \( \{(a, b), (a, d), (c, d)\} \cap \{\{a, \ast\}\} = \{(a, b), (a, d)\} \);
- \( |\{\ast\}| = \infty, |\{a, \ast\}| = \infty \) and \( |\{\ast, a\}| = \infty \).

The conflict of interest rule: \( P_{\text{CoI}}(\pi_1, \{\text{medical, private}\}) \) means an entity can handle the concern medical or private but not both. \( P_{\text{CoI}}(\text{id}, \{\{\text{private, \ast}\}\}) \) means an entity can only ever manipulate the private data of a single user.

**Example – conflict of interest:** Consider the example used in §III-E on isolating application instances that manipulate car data for different companies. If a new company was to use the application, a new tag would need to be added to the CoI group. For a rule applying to a more rapidly changing set this could prove problematic.

Using the FlowK2 model, we have application instances labeled
\( |S = \{\langle \text{car}, \text{ford}\rangle, I = \emptyset\}, |S = \{\langle \text{car}, \text{fiat}\rangle, I = \emptyset\}\) etc. and the CoI policy is expressed as: \( P_{\text{CoI}}(\text{id}, \{\langle \text{car, \ast}\rangle\}) \). This is simple to read and understand (i.e. an application instance can manipulate information for only one specifier of concern car) and this policy will not change over time as companies come and go.

**D. Compatibility with Single-Component Tags**

Certain tags in our original work create no problems as single-component tags. For example, \( \{\text{network-input}\} \) may be included in an Integrity label to indicate that input data should not be trusted. The tags \( \{\text{EU-data}\} \) and \( \{\text{US-data}\} \) can be used to enforce the geographical location of stored data to allow laws and regulations to be enforced. Such tags do not need to be two-component tags but can conveniently be expressed as such, e.g. \( \{\text{input, network}\} \) or \( \{\text{location, EU}\} \). Policy may or may not be conveniently expressed for such tags using \( \ast \), but if \( \ast \) is never used, our two-component tag model degrades gracefully to what is effectively a conventional one-component tag model since both components must match for data to flow, as for two separate tags. Backwards compatibility with policies defined for atomic tags, could be achieved e.g. by a convention that the single tag should become a specifier of a null concern in a two-component tag.

**E. Is More General Tag Complexity Needed?**

A major research question (§I) is “which aspects of access control policies need to be embodied in IFC tags for continuous, runtime, cross-application enforcement?” It is possible to design tags that capture every aspect of e.g. parametrised RBAC with environmental constraints [3]. But for IFC to be deployed in practice it needs to be simple to understand and evaluate and to impose minimal overheads due to management and enforcement. Further work is needed on IFC label design for specific (cross-application) use cases, but our experience to date is that few tags are needed to capture legal/regulatory and compliance requirements at runtime [3], [29] and many checks need only be done at authorisation points in applications. In this work we have seen the need to generalise tags for a specific style of application that is central to cloud service provision, large-scale data analytics.

**VI. Evaluation**

Our IFC platform is built from several components: a local OS IFC enforcement system [2] and a messaging middleware for inter-process communication within our cloud platform [30]. Above these building blocks it is possible to build a PaaS (and by extension SaaS) platform as discussed in [2]. [4]. Performance evaluation of FlowK was carried out on a quad-core 2.2Ghz Intel i7 with 6GiB of RAM running Fedora 20 (kernel version 3.14). Our aim here is strictly to compare the performance of the 2D tag model compared with atomic tags and not to evaluate a specific implementation, as this is already available in [2].

Suppose a data analysis worker needs to be given access to the data belonging to several users (see [IV]). We assume each user has his data uniquely labelled. To run under IFC, the number of tags needed by the analyser increases linearly with the number of users.

Firstly, we run the 1D tag model’s IFC constraints algorithm over an increasing number of secrecy tags. That is, for four users we would have data labelled as \( S = \{\text{medical, alice}, S = \{\text{medical, bob}\} \) etc. and the analysing process labelled as \( S = \{\text{medical, alice, bob, ...}\} \).

Secondly, we run the 2D tag model in 1D tag compatibility mode (see [V-D]). That is, the data to be analysed is labelled as \( S = \{\langle \text{medical, alice} \rangle\} \) etc. and the analysing process as \( S = \{\langle \text{medical, alice}, \langle \text{medical, bob}\rangle, ...\} \).

Finally, we use the full power of our proposed 2D tag model. That is, \( \text{data to be analysed is labelled as} = \{\langle \text{medical, alice} \rangle\} \) etc. and the analysing process as \( S = \{\langle \text{medical, alice}, \langle \text{medical, bob}\rangle, ...\} \)

We take an analysis process with a label size varying from 0 to 100 tags, the data label is taken from the tags present in the analysis process’s label. We repeat the operation 100,000 times and average the result. We see clearly that when using the \( \{\ast\} \) specifier in policy, the performance is not dependent on the number of users. This is extremely important in a cloud environment where the number of tags required to analyse user data could scale to the millions.

As discussed previously and presented in [2], there is a cost to security interposition that is not affected by the complexity of the policy to be enforced. The worst case complexity of the 1D tag policy algorithm is \( O(n) \). On average, the worst case complexity of our 2D tag model is \( O(n^2) \). However, we have seen that in scenarios when label complexity has a major impact on performance (i.e. the number of tags is high), the 2D tag model may reduce the number of tags necessary for the policy to be expressed.

In practice, it is likely that IFC would need to be deactivated or data aggressively declassified in order to perform
such analyses when using the standard IFC model. Indeed, the management of such a policy through an existing list of user-associated tags would rapidly become impossible, without even considering performance issues, for services with a large user base. We believe our proposed model allows such operations to remain controlled by IFC with good performance, easy policy management and without compromising users’ data security.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The feasibility of IFC has been demonstrated in practical systems: in the database domain, for web-applications, for cloud-service composition, within OS, across distributed systems, for PaaS, for networks, for hypervisors and for cloud data processing. It has been shown that, with careful design, IFC does not require changes to cloud tenant applications, but would require some engineering effort by the cloud provider.

The benefit of providing IFC as part of cloud services is that IFC supports both application isolation and data sharing between applications as required. Cross-application data sharing, as opposed to strong isolation, is of increasing importance, particularly when cloud services form part of IoT architectures. As clouds become akin to utilities that provide computing services, proof of compliance with regulations and contracts will become necessary. IFC naturally provides audit at a meaningful data-specific level, rather than via system logs.

Previous IFC implementations have followed the standard atomic tag model which is simple to express and enforce, but is infeasible for use in large-scale data analysis, where the number of tags required to enforce individuals’ privacy scales with the number of entities to be processed. We have shown that a simple extension of this model to two-dimensional tags allows IFC to be used for large-scale data analysis, with equivalent (or improved) performance and enhanced policy expression and maintenance.